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ABSTRACT
In this paper a model is developed to study an inland waterway market’s production uncertainty due to fluctuating 
water-levels. Aspects that are studied  are climate  change and adaptation strategies  against climate  change. As  an 
example of private adaptation the optimal barge-size, and as an example of public adaptation the optimal amount to 
investment in infrastructure  are derived. We  find that the trend to inc rease barge sizes in the Western  European 
market is theoretically justified. We also show that dredging may be a cost-effective strategy for the Netherlands to 
cope with climate change.
1 Introduction
In  many  markets,  supply  is  by  its  very nature affected  by  weather conditions.  Important 
examples are agriculture, tourism, and transport. For these markets, weather conditions can be 
regarded as an exogenous source of production uncertainty which results in a highly correlated 
shocks  in o utput  for  producers  within  certain  geographical areas.  Production  uncertainty 
encompasses ma rket uncertainty, where market prices for inputs and/or outputs are uncertain, 
and technological uncertainty, where the amount of the output to be obtained is uncertain (seeGravelle and Rees, 1992, pp. 643-670).
1 Markets that are affected by weather conditions will 
also  be exposed  to  climate change,  which  may  be defined  as a structural shift  in  weather 
conditions.
2
The most studied form of production uncertainty in the economic literature is weather 
uncertainty and its influence on the agricultural market. An essential feature of the agricultural 
market is that the outputs of agricultural firms are strongly correlated  with weather shocks, at 
least at a regional level and for similar products. For example, Solomou and Wu (1999) measure 
weather effects on agricultural output in Western-Europe for the period 1850-1913. They find 
that weather shocks explain between one-third and two-thirds of the variation in agricultural 
output.
In  this paper we study  (in addition to optimal  infrastructure  investment)  the welfare 
effects of choosing an optimal bargesize, which shows similarity to the optimal input choice in 
the agricultural economics literature that is first developed in the 1970s. A key study is Feder 
(1980), who studies  the  optimal  scale of  operation  for cultivating  modern  crops under  new 
technology and uncertainty. He derives both the optimal amount of fertilizer and optimal amount 
of land to be used in an agricultural production process. Pope and Kramer (1979) also derive 
optimal input choice under uncertainty, and conclude that an increase in uncertainty may lead to 
an increased usage of inputs.While our model setting shows similarities with these studies, we 
particularly focus on models with closed form solutions. This  has a number of advantages. For 
example, it facilitates the interpretation of the theoretical results. Moreover, it simplifies the 
numerical analyses. We use the model to study the effects of public intervention on welfare in 
the inland navigation sector.
Transport  is a market  which  is str ongly influenced by weather  conditions. Weather 
variables, such as rainfall, snow, ice, and wind, have different, but mostly negative, impacts on 
the output of the different transport modes. For an empirical overview ofthe effects of weather 
(and climate change) on transport, se e Koetse and Rietveld (2009). They conclude that: (i) most 
studies focus on passenger  transport rather than  freight transport; (ii) the  effect of extreme 
                                                   
1 ‘Technological uncertainty’ is also called ‘output uncertainty’ in the literature (see Saha, 1994). Pope and Kramer 
(1979) also use the term ‘production uncertainty’ for what we call ‘technological uncertainty’.
2 For example, for the inland navigation market, the relevant effect of climate change is the expected change in the 
statistical properties of water levels, which determine available capacities for transport.weather on transport accidents has received most attention; (iii) most studies deal with the effect 
of short-term variations in weather, whereas studies that consider long-term impacts are rare.
The inland navigation market, is strongly affected by weather conditions, as rainfall and 
temperature  (through evaporation)  have  an  influence  on  water levels. As mentioned  in the 
introduction, extremely high water levels may lead to navigation halts on rivers, as navigation 
becomes too dangerous because of flood risk, and may give problems with infrastructure like 
bridges and motorways. Extreme low water levels reduce available freight capacities for carriers, 
as a minimum distance must be maintained between the barge and the bottom of the river. Both 
extreme low and high water levels lead to economic welfare losses due to limitations in supply. 
For empirical estimates of welfare losses due to low water levels,see Jonkeren et al. (2007).
In recent years, the River Rhine in Western Europe has been the main example of a river 
that is potentially affected by climate change. The Rhine is the most important waterway in 
Europe. About 70 per cent of all inland waterway transport in the former EU-15 Member States 
is carried via the Rhine (see Jonkeren et al., 2007). As a result of climate change, water levels on 
this river may become structurally lower in summer and higher in winter. Also more variation in 
water levels in summer is predicted for the future.
3
The  choice  of  barge size  may  function  as  an  instrument  to  cope  with  water-level 
uncertainty.4 While one advantage is that a larger barge makes it possible to benefit from returns
to scale, a disadvantage is that large barges are relatively more affected by low water levels than 
small  barges.  Under  uncertainty  in  water levels,  a  trade-off  between  advantages  and 
disadvantages must be made. Even now, when climate change is (only) expected, barge operators 
have  to  make investment  decisions regarding  the size  of their  barges that have  long-lasting 
consequences.
However, optimal adjustment to climate change is not just a m atter of private sector 
adjustment. The public sector in its role of the supplier of the waterway infrastructure might also 
contribute. An important question is what the optimal composition of the overall adjustment 
strategy is in terms of the shares of the private and the public sector. More in particular, we will 
address the potential contribution of both private and public actors when they act independently, 
and compare this with the case when a joint optimization takes place.
                                                   
3 For evidence see a study on future water-level discharges on the Rhine by Te Linde (2007).
4 In the analysis we keep barge-design constant, which may be a topic for further research.We formulate a theoretical model which determines market equilibrium and economic 
welfare  under choice  of optimal  barge size  and amount of  infrastructure  investment by the 
government. The number of active barge operators and the freight prices are also dependent on 
the degree of uncertainty in water levels. Higher freight prices may result because of a scarcity 
effect  wh en  capacity  is  r educed.  Higher  freight prices  may  or  m ay  not  compensate  barge
operators for the reduction in capacity. For certain choices of the form of the Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility
5 function and the demand function, we are able to derive the optimal barge
size analytically.
In Section 2 we present the theoretical framework for the inland navigation market under 
water-level uncertainty.In Section 3 we determine the equilibrium freight prices, the equilibrium 
number of barges active in the market and expected welfare. In Section 4 we derive the optimal 
barge size  chosen  by barge operators  in  the  market.  In  Section 5  we present an analysis of 
infrastructure investment. Section 6 then gives the numerical presentation of the work described 
in Sections 2 to 5, including a sensitivity analysis with respect to climate change. Section 7 
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section we formulate a theoretical framework to study the strategies of carriers and the 
government to cope with output uncertainty, as outlined in the Introduction. An abstract setting is 
chosen,where we assume demand for transport from one end point, e.g. a mainport, to the other 
end point, e.g. the hinterland. Transport occurs at discrete points in time at   = 1,2,…, , where 
  is measured in a period of fixed length, e.g. a week. We will apply this setting to the inland 
navigation market, assuming output uncertainty due to water-level uncertainty, but it is of course 
applicable to any setting.
We now focus on the supply side. Barge operators are assumed to be identical, possess 
exactly one barge, and are risk averse. At    =  0, barge operators decide whether or not to enter 
the market. When   > 0, a barge operator cannot leave the market until   =  , so the number of 
bargeoperators    is fixed during this period.
                                                   
5 See Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).For each barge operator, the effective (supply) capacity available for transport at time  , 
  , depends on the water level at  . When water levels are low, capacity is restricted, as a 
minimum distance must be maintained between the bottom of the river and the barge. Therefore, 
in the relevant range of waterlevels, capacity increases with water levels. We assume a discrete 
probability distribution of   , which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed at 
discrete moments in-time   = 1,2,..., .
We assume that a barge operator incurs only fixed costs   (including costs of transport). 
This may be justified as fixed costs account fo r the majority of a barge operator’s total costs. For 
a trip beginning at time  ,   is paid at the beginning of a period  , and the revenue is received at 
the end of the trip at time   + 1. We assume that freight prices for a trip beginning at time   are 
fully  determined by supply and demand  factors  at time  .  We assume  a constant elasticity 
demand function for transport with elasticity  . Aggregate demand    in tonnes is then given by:
   =      =    
 , where   > 0,   < 0, (1)






Following conventions in financial economics, it is assumed that the barge operators’ objective 
function depends on returns on investment (rather than profits)
6. Periodical returns are defined by 
profits      −  relative to expenses  . So we denote the periodical return by     =
    
  − 1. We 
assume that there exist markets (e.g. stock markets), where barge operators reinvest their excess 
returns, that yield returns identical to the returns on their investment in the inland navigation 
market (we do not see this assumption as essential but this reduces the complexity of the model). 
The  overall return    for  the  period  between    = 0 and   =   is  then  defined  by   =
∏ (1+    )  
    −1.
In  order  to  model  the  barge operator’s  preferences  under  uncertainty,  we  use  the 
commonly  employed expected utility  approach.
7 In  this model, economic  agents  base their 
                                                   
6 By using returns rather than profits, we are also able to derive analytical results.
7 For a theoretical introduction, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995).decisions on the expected value of the utility given the probability distribution of the underlying 
uncertainty. We use a utility function that is logarithmic and exhibits decreasing relative risk 
aversion (DARA)
8. This utility function is widely used and can be formulated
9 as: 
 ( ) = ln(1 + ). (3)
Barge operators  base  their  entry decision on  the  expected  utility  of entering,  which  is  in 
expanded form equal to:




 ln  −ln  + 1 +
 
   [ln  ] , (4)
where we used the assumption of an independent and identical distribution of capacities over 
time. The probability distribution of capacities is assumed to be discrete, where    denotes the 
probability  that  capacity     is  realized,  for  possible  state  of  the  water  levels    = 1,.., . 
Furthermore, water-level states are assumed to be ordered in an increasing manner, meaning that 
a higher   means a higher water level. We also assume that a higher water level implies a higher 
capacity    per barge.
3 Equilibrium
The barge operators’ utility of investing in risk-free assets is  (  ) = ln(1 +   ), where   
denotes the overall risk-free interest rate; and    denotes the periodical risk-free interest rate, so 
   = (1+   ) /  − 1. The free entry condition imp lies that the expected utility which barge
operators derive from their investment is equal to investing in risk-free assets. So the equilibrium 
condition on returns is  [ ( )] =  (  ).
This condition, combined with (4), yields the equilibrium number of barges,   :
                                                   
8 By ‘exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)’, we mean that the Pratt-Arrow  absolute risk aversion 
coefficient is  decreasing, which  is  def ined  as  ( ) =−   ( )/  ( ), where    is  the Pratt-Arrow  relative  risk 
aversion coefficient;    is the  utility  function;  and    may  be a  quantity  such  as  income  or  return.  A  decreasing
absolute risk aversion coefficient means that the risk aversion decreases for higher levels of income or return, which 
was argued by Pratt (1964) to be quite in line with people’s observed behaviour . For more details, see, e.g., Varian 
(1995). 











It is seen that    depends on the elasticity of demand  , and the geometric mean of the barge 
capacity. If demand is elastic (  < −1),    depends positively on the (geometric) mean of the 
capacity, and negatively if demand is inelastic (−1 <   < 0). This implies that a higher capacity 
leads to less barges in the inelastic case, but to more barges in the elastic one.












This ex pression shows that both realized capacity at time   and the properties of the capacity 
distribution function play a role in the determination of the price per tonne at time  , since   < 0, 
   depends negatively on realized capacity   . Furthermore, if demand is elastic (  < −1),   
depends negatively on the geometric mean of   , and vice versa if demand is inelastic (−1 <
  < 0). For the special case that   =−1,  one gets    = (1+   ) /   , and prices per tonne do 
not depend on the geometric mean of the capacity in a certain period.
To compare the effects of different interventions to cope with water level uncertainty or, 
to be more specific, the increasing probability of low water levels due to climate change, we are 
interested in expected welfare  [ ]. In the welfare analysis, the profits of barge operators can 





where     denotes the consumer surplus at time   derived from transport on the market analysed, 
and   =(1 +  )   is  the weekly discount factor. We consider changes in expected welfare ∆ [ ]=  [ ]−  [   ] ,  where   [   ] is  the  expected  welfare  in a  reference  case.  This 
expression can be written as
10:
∆ [ ]=  [ ]−   [   ] =
      
   























4 Optimal barge size
In  this  section,  we  derive  optimality  conditions  for  the  optimal  barge  size  chosen  by  a 
representative barge operator, and present a closed-fo rm solution of the optimal barge size under 
certain assumptions.
In the optimal barge-size discussion,barge-size capacities    and the cost function   need 
to be specified as function of the barge size. Barge size     is defined as the maximum value of the 
capacity  function  (in tonnes),  which  means     =    {   ,  = 1,2,.. } =  .
11 Capacities  are 
denoted  by    (   ) and  the  cost  function  by   (   ). Given  this  notation,  expected  utility  as 
formulated in (4) becomes:
 [ ( )] =     ln 
    
      =   [ln   + ln   − ln (   )]
=   ( [ln  ]+  [ln  (   )] −ln (   )).
As barge operators are price-takers, and no barge operator can influence the price individually, 
the first-order condition (FOC) for expected utility maximization with respect to     is:
  [ ( )]




 (   )  = 0,
or in a more compact form:
                                                   
10 For intermediate steps, see Appendix A.
11 We assume that barges are designed such that there is no ‘redundant’ capacity, which means that all     tonnes per 





This ex pression may be interpreted as a ‘(relative) marginal benefit equals (relative) marginal 
cost’ condition.
The second-order condition (SOC) for expected utility maximization with respect to    
gives:
   [ ( )]

















or in a more compact form:
  
  ′′(   )











We provide a binary example (  = 2), where we have capacity   (   ) =     for high water levels 
 , and capacity   (   ) <     for high water levels  , and w here    and    are the associated 
probabilities.




  (   ) + (1−  )
 
    =
   ′(    )
 (   ) .


















As one  may expect,  the  first-order  and  second-order  conditions  restrict  the  choice  of  the 
functional forms of  (   ) and   (   ), as well as their parameter values. We choose an example 
with the following functional forms that have empirical support, (see  Section 6 for numerical 
examples):   (   ) =   +         and   (   )=         with    ,  ,  ,  ,   > 0.  If  the  SOC 
holds, this yields a unique global optimal barge size
12:
                                                   
























which means that a higher probability of low  water levels (or, otherwise stated, more extreme 
climate change) leads to the choice of smaller barge if the capacity function is concave (   <
1). If the capacity function is indeed concave (   < 1), the comparative statics with respect to 


















Thus, a more convex capacity function leads to the choice of larger ships. For the convexity 
parameter of  the cost  function, it  is  immediately clear  that 
    
   
< 0.  This  means that  more 
expensi ve capacity leads to the choice forsm aller barges. We observe that the optimal barge size 
does not depend on the elasticity of demand. An explanation for this is that barge operators 
individually  cannot  influence  the  market  freight price  when  they  choose  their  barge  size. 
Therefore, the elasticity parameter does not enter the first order condition.
5 Optimal infrastructure investments by government
Another instrument, this time available to the government, is the investment in inland waterway 
infrastructure. Inland waterways may be adjusted to cope better with water-level uncertainty and 
climate  change.  Usually this  means dredging the river or building barrages across the  river, 
which both have an  increasing  effect on  water levels  and therefore  capacities.  Infrastructure 
investments are modelled such that capacities increase as an effect of a monetary investment. Therefore,  apart  from  empirical  considerations,  we  do  not need  to  specify  the type  of 
infrastructure project.
Technically, we model an investment in an infrastructure project as increased capacities 
    (   ) such that     (   )>   (   ) for   =  1,…, . The cost of investment in infrastructure at the 
beginning  of a period  (year) is  denoted  by    =   {    (   )}   ,..,  .  Optimal  investments  are 
derived  from  maximizing  the  change  in e xpected  welfare
13,  where  a  level  of  zero  for  the 






























     −  .
We also need to substitute the equilibrium value of   , as from a social planner’s perspective the 


































     −  
This is the criterion which is maximized in the numerical welfare analysis in Section 6. In two 
cases, only investments in infrastructure are considered, and ∆ [ ] is maximized over  . In 
order to maximize over  , further assumption are made on     (∙) in all presented cases. In two 
other cases, both infrastructure investments and capacity choice are considered. ∆ [ ] is then 
maximized over  , and  [ ( )] is maximized over    . The expression for  [ ( )] for the cases 
where both optimal barge size and optimal investment in infrastructure are chosen becomes:
 [ ( )] =     [ln ]+   ln      (   )  − ln (   ) .
                                                   
13 Delta expected welfare is taken in order to avoid problems with infinite expected welfare for some elasticities.In the entire numerical analysis, optimization occurs through finding a solution to the first-order 
condition, and evaluating the expression of the second order condition.
6 Numerical welfare analysis
In  this section,  we provide the numerical results of the theoretical  analysis of the previous 
Sections  2  to  5.  The  change  in  (expected)  welfare  is  used  as  a criterion  to  evaluate  the 
attractiveness to society of an investment strategy, when the choice of barge si ze is based on 
expected utility. Given a reference situation, we present seven additional cases (making a total of 
eight cases) where we study how barge-size adjustment and infrastructure investment both affect 
welfare,  under a  climate  change  sc enario.  We  choose  dredging  as  a  potential  example  of 
infrastructure  investment.  We  keep  the  analysis  as  realistic  as  possible,  given  the current 
knowledge ofthe cost of infrastructure improvements, and choose values for input parameters 
based on empirical studies. We provide a sensitivity analysis with respect to the scale parameter 
of cost function of infrastructure investments. We also study the sensitivity of the results to the 
elasticity of demand for transport. The water-level distribution is taken as binary, with a low 
water-level state and a high water-level state (although it is continuous, as shown in the empirical 
estimation of the effective load capacity later on).
Our assumption of the elasticity of demand is based on the study by Jonkeren (2009, pp. 32), 
so we take a value of -0.5. The scale parameter   is calibrated to the value of 2.5∗ 10  in order 
to obtain a number of barges that reflect the observed number of barges in the Rhine market, 
which is around 9700 (for an overview of the composition of the Rhine fleet, see CCNR and 
European Commission, 2007). The weekly risk-free interest rate per week,   , is taken as 0.1per 
cent ( corresponding to a value of approximately 5.3per cent per year). The decision horizon for 
a bargeoperator to exit the market once it has entered the market is taken as one year, so   = 52
weeks. This assumption can be considered as a minimum period for holding an investment in this 
market from a liquidity perspective.
We assume that the effective capacity depends on water level  . A regression equation is 
estimated from trip data on the Rhine market (Vaart!Vrachtindicator, 2003-2007) in order to 
obtain an expression for effective capacity. In this regression we set water level at 260 cmfor the case where   > 260 cm, as the effective capacity is unaffected for water levels above that
threshold. After estimation, the regression becomes:
14
lnloadfactor= −0.0134826  − 0.5850203 ln    + 0.0027283  ln    +         (7)
In this equation   denotes the other control variables such as distance, travel time, month of the 
year and cargo type. Effective capacity can be derived  from (7), given the assumption that 
loadfactor is proportional to effective capacity. Therefore, when comparing relative differences 
in loadfactor, loadfactor may be substituted by 
 ( )
    , where  ( ) denotes effective capacity. By 





      = 0.0134826 (260−  ) −0.0027283 (260 −  )ln   ,
or equivalently:
 ( ) =   .        (     )      .       (     ).  (8)
As the exponent of     will be smaller than 1 in (8), we  use the minimum-operator to avoid 
 ( ) >    for small    . This gives our preferred specification of the effective capacity function:
 ( ) = min    ,  .        (     )      .       (     ) .
In  the remainder,  we continue  with  a binary  water-level/capacity-distribution. In our 
reference case, the capacity of barges at a high water level    (=    ) is set equal to 1500tonnes, 
which may be considered a representative (median) barge in terms of capacity (see CCNR and 
European Commission, 2007). The cost per week for the barge operator as a function of     takes 
the form of  (   ) = 8000  .        − 5770. These figures are taken as an approximation to values 
reported by NEA (2008).
                                                   
14 For more detailed regession output, see Appendix D.In the analysis, we assume the length of the trip to be equal to 400 km, which is based on 
the Vaart!Vrachtindicator (2003-2006), and is representative as an average for trips between the 
Port of  Rotterdam  and popular  destinations  in  Germany.  Concerning the binary  water-level 
distribution we make the following assumptions. We assume that the water levels at Emmerich, 
which i s a place on the Rhine close to the German-Dutch border, are representative for the entire 
trip-length. As  a cut-off  value  which  distinguishes  l ow water levels  from  high water-level 
distributions we take 190 cm. Furthermore, we assume that the year 2005 is representative for a 
year before climate change, and that the extreme dry year 2003 is representative for a year after 
climate change. From water-level data from iidesk.nl we obtain that, before climate change, the 
low-water probability  is  roughly  represented  by    = 1/3, and  for  hi gh water levels it  is
   = 2/3. After climate change, we assume this is    = 2/3 and    = 1/3.
By using Rijkswaterstaat data
15, we obtain an investment cost function for dredging on 
the  Waal  (the  main  part  of  Rhine  in  the  Netherlands)  We  assume  there  are  no 
economies/diseconomies of scale, so this investment cost function can be extrapolated to the 
entire trip length of 400 km. The investment cost function is approximated by:
  = ∆           ∗ 1.2∗ 1.01
(∆             ),  (9)
where   is the annualized investment cost in millions of euros, and ∆           is the cm 
increase in the water level due to dredging.
This set  of  input values gives  rise to  an equilibrium  outcome, which is presented  in 
Tables 1, 2 and 3. Note that in these tables  [ ] is the expected price per tonne, and  [   ] is 
the expected weekly total revenue for the barge operators. Furthermore, ∆ [ ],  [   ] and  
are given in thousands of euros. In Table 1 the outcome before climate change is presented:
                                                   
15 We thank Siemen Prins f rom Rijkswaterstaat for his help in providing cost data.Table 1: Optimal barge size and infrastructure investment before climate change.
Case
Barge-size Infrastructure ΔE[W] 













I - 9,670 8.36 2.97 4.77 52,829 894 1,500 - -
II  23,354 5,894 9.09 2.51 4.70 51,500 1,407 2,680 - -
III  8,347 9,448 6.64 3.11 4.29 50,867 1,027 1,500 21.5 26,134
IV   44,883 5,381 5.96 2.72 3.80 47,814 1,903 2,819 32.0 43,276
In Case II, where we study barge-size adjustments alone, it can be seen that market forces would 
imply an increase in the current median barge size from 1,500 to about 2,700 tonnes. This is in 
line with the reports from the market that there is a tendency to increase barge size. For example,
Rabobank  Capaciteitsmonitor  (2007)  reports  that  the  average  capacity  in t he  Dutch  inland 
navigation fleet increased from 1,500 to 1,622 tonnes between the years 2000 and 2005. Also 
Buck C onsultants (2008) and CBS (2010)
16 report increases in barge size. This shift seem s to be 
consistent with welfare-economic trade-offs (the gain in welfare is about €23.4 million per year). 
The reason of this gap between the actual size of barges and the optimal barge size may be 
attributed to, among others things,a lag effect that barges have in practice a long-lasting lifetime. 
In Case III, where we look at infrastructure investments (alone), we see that the optimal annual 
investment is €26.1 million, corresponding to a dredging of 21.5 cm, which results in a net 
expected  welfare  gain  of  €8.3 million  annually. This  implies  a  benefit-cost ratio  of  about 
1.32 (≈(26.1+ 8.3)/26.1) (note that this result holds before any change in climate conditions). 
Combining the two adaptation strategies, there is a welfare gain of €44.9million, which is, it is 
important  to  note,  considerably  more  than  the  gain  of  the  two  strategies  separately.  The 
mechanism underlying this ‘ super-additivity’-effect is that it is attractive to hold even larger 
barges  in  the new  infrastructure  environment,  which  yields  an  additional  welfare  gain.  In 
addition, it should be noted that when barge size increases, less barges become necessary in the 
market (a drop from about 9,700 in case I to 5,900in Case II and 5,400in Case IV). The results 
for the situation afterclimate change are given in Table 2:
                                                   
16 For the relevant CBS table, see Appendix C.Table 2: Optimal barge size and infrastructure investment after climate change.
Case
Barge-size Infrastructure ΔE[W] 













V -80,297 10,541 7.04 2.50 5.53 57,396 894 1,500 - -
VI  -66,883 7,374 7.16 2.09 5.47 56,633 1,267 2,344 - -
VII  -35,995 9,573 4.79 3.03 4.20 50,979 1,193 1,500 44.7 68,514
VIII   3,545 5,445 4.11 2.69 3.64 47,467 2,264 2,801 53.9 90,715
Note: The reference value for welfare is the current situation without climate change, i.e. Case I.
As may be expected climate change has a welfare-decreasing effect. If no measures are taken a 
welfare  loss  of  €80.3 million  per year  will  occur.  When  only  barge-size  adjustments  are 
considered, smaller barges are preferred than in the situation before climate change (2,344 vs. 
2,680 tonnes before) as a reaction of barge operators to mo re frequent low water levels. When 
additional infrastructure investments take place, a slight decrease in optimal barge size occurs 
(2,801vs 2,819 tonnes before). Cases VII and VIII show that a government will have to invest 
more in infrastructure as a reaction to climate change. When the right measures are taken in 
bargesize and infrastructure optimization, the situation after climate change (Case VIII) can still 
be a slight improvement over the current situation (Case I) with an expected welfare gain of €3.5
million.  The  welfare  gain  (net  of  a  climate  change  effect  of  −€80.3 million)  of  both 
infrastructure investment and barge-size optimization is €83.8million (3.5+ 80.3). This is again 
more than the sum of the effects of only barge size optimization €13.4 million (−66.9+ 80.3)
and the effect of infrastructure investment €44.3million (−36.0+80.3).
We are also interested in the ‘net’ effect of climate change after optimization has taken 
place. This means that we again do welfare analysis where Case IV  is taken as the reference 
situation  (in  this  case, barge  size  and  depth  of  dredging are  2,819 tonne  and  32.0cm,
respectively). The results of a climate change for this situation are given in Table 3. Importantly, 
the ‘net’ effect of climate change on barge-si ze choice (Case VI) is that barge sizes are decreased 
(from 2,819to 2,611), while there was an increase (from 1500 to 2,344) when starting from the 
suboptimal  situation.  The  annual  welfare  loss of  climate  change  (in  Δ [ ] terms)  after
optimizing barge size is €54.1 million and is  €41.4 million so somewhat lower after additional
dredging. The welfare effect of both measures taken together is a loss of €41.3 million, and 
‘super-additivity’ no longer holds.Table 3: Optimal barge size and infrastructure investment after climate change based on optimal 
levels before climate change.
Case
Barge-size Infrastructure ΔE[W] 














V -55,603 5,745 5.23 2.38 4.28 50,977 1,903 2,819 32.0 43,276
VI  -54,137 6,167 5.19 2.41 4.26 50,893 1,780 2,611 32.0 43,276
VII  -41,361 5,410 4.11 2.69 3.64 47,454 2,279 2,819 54.0 90,978
VIII   -41,338 5,445 4.11 2.69 3.64 47,467 2,264 2,801 53.9 90,715
Note: The reference value for welfare is Case  IV. The values for the capacity     and the investment level   are the 
optimal values before climate change.
We see that the Case VIII in both Table 2 and Table 3 yield the same barge size and dredging 
depths. However in cases VI, the fact that already more has been dredged in the analysis ‘after-
initial-optimization’, appears to motivate having larger barges in Table 3. A similar reasoning 
holds for the Cases VII in both tables.
An important conclusion of Tables 1 to 3 is that climate change may lead to a substantial 
welfare decrease in this market (about €80 million per year). However, a considerable part of this 
decrease is due to that barge size and water management intensity are already at suboptimal 
levels in the initial situation, so for the current climate conditions. Once barge size and water 
management are at their optimal levels for the current climate conditions, the negative effects of 
climate change are about €55million per year, so substantially smaller than the above-mentioned 
€80 million. Also, the welfare losses of adjusting barge size and water management intensity to 
their new optimal levels are then somewhat lower (from €55 to €41 million per year).
Another important conclusion is that for the initial situation, which describes the current 
barge market, the major welfare optimizing adjustment appears to be by the barge operators, so 
in the private domain (upward barge-size adjustment). This conclusion is consistent with the 
stylised fact that the average size of barges has increased substantially over the last decades. 
Once the system is optimised under current climate conditions, the public sector appears to be 
the strongest contributor to the minimisation of welfare decrease due to climate change. So, both 
private and public actors have a role to play in the optimization of adaptation strategies. The 
balance of the two depends on the initial conditions in the market. The upward adjusting of barge 
size is a costly process in the short run, but not in the long run when older barges are withdrawn 
from the market. Therefore the optimal government policy is to let the market slowly adjust barge size and adjust water management intensity levels only gradually. There is no reason for 
the government to interfere with the private decisions of barge operators regarding barge size.
We performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to two parameters: on the one hand with 
respect to the scale parameter of the infrastructure investment function, on the other with respect 
to the scale parameter of the constant elasticity of demand parameter  . The scale parameter of 
the investment cost function infrastructure, which was initially set at 1.2, is in the sensitivity 
analysis set at 0.6 and 2.4 respectively, which represent halving and doubling the investment 
costs. As may be expected this has a significant impact on the investment made in infrastructure. 
The number of centimetres dredged is in certain cases more than doubled or halved respectively. 
This shows that the results are still sensitive with respect to the scale parameter of the cost 
function. The optimal barge size, under combined dredging and barge-size optimization, seems 
hardly affected by the change in the cost scale parameter: the incentive to approximately double 
the barge size remains. For the elasticity parameter  , the initial value for this parameter was 
assumed to be −0.5 in the analysis above. In a sensitivity analysis, we have used the values 
−0.25, −1.0, and −2.0 (with an additional scaling of the constant in the demand function such 
that the equilibrium number of barges for the cases I remained constant at 9,670). The optimal 
barge size is  again hardly affected under this parameter change: about doubling is seen for all 
relevant cases. For the cases after climate change, a consistent pattern is observed that the higher 
the  elasticity of  demand  (in  absolute sense),  the higher the optimal  level  of investment  in 
infrastructure. From the sensitivity analysis, it can be concluded that the optimal barge size is 
rather insensitive to the specification of the investment cost function and the elasticity of demand 
for transport, but that the optimal invest in infrastructure is sensitive.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we formulate a theoretical model to describe the low water-level uncertainty in the 
inland navigation market. Climate change is expected to occur, which has implications for this 
market with regard to water-level uncertainty. A negative effect of climate change on welfare is 
expected due to the increase in cost per tonne of transport when low water levels occur more 
frequently. The market actors may take measures to adapt to the new situation of climate change. 
                                                   
17 A full output of this sensitivity analysis is available upon request.As an example, we studied barge-size adjustments by barge operators. Under certain simplifying 
assumptions, we  w ere able to  derive  the optimal barge size  analytically. An  increase  in the 
convexity of cost functions, the concavity of the capacity function, and the probabilities of low 
water levels  will  lead to the  choice of sm aller  barges. A property of the constant  elasticity 
demand context that we adopted is that the choice of optimal barge size does not depend on the 
elasticity of demand.
Numerically  it  was shown that  in the  current  market  (both bef ore and  after climate 
change) there are incentives to almost double the barge si ze. The reason that this still has not 
occurred may be explained by the long lifetime of barges that are currently in use. Thus, climate 
change does not provide a reason to stop the current trend towards larger barges. The only effect 
is that this trend towards larger barges will end at a lower size than would be the case without 
climate change. The government may also take measures to decrease the harm caused by climate 
change. In this study we consider an investment in infrastructure by means of dredging. We find 
a benefit-cost ratio higher than 1 for this for investments both before and after climate change. 
Thus, both with and without climate change, welfare would increase if government intensifies 
dredging.
When studying  the  ‘net’  effect of  climate change,  which  means  that  we assume that 
barge-size  choice and  the  investment  in  infrastructure  is  optimal  before climate  change,  we 
observe that the barge size decreases about 8 per cent when only barge-size adjustments are 
considered. The increase in infrastructure investments is still considerable, which is about 70 per 
cent more than the optimal situation before climate change. This would m ean that, after climate 
change, public adaptation may be more important than private adaptation when the situation is 
optimal before climate change.
For the combined effect of barge-size adjustment and infrastructure investment, it can be 
concluded that the benefit in terms of expected welfare is ‘super-additive’ for the situation before 
climate and also for the situation after climate change when starting from the current situation. 
This ‘super-additivity’property can be attributed to the opportunity for barge operators to hold 
even larger barges in the new environment where low water is less harmful for their capacities. 
However,  for the situation  after  climate change, when starting from  an optimized  si tuation, 
super-additivity no longer holds.A sensitivity analysis  was performed  with  respect  to the  elasticity parameter  of  the 
demand function and the scale parameter of the cost function of infrastructure investment. The 
optimal barge size is rather insensitive in the change of these two parameters. Doubling barge
size is observed consistently. However, the amount to invest in infrastructure quite depends on 
the parameter specification in the cost of investment and the demand function.
A few limitations  of the  model  are the assumptions of one  barge size,  one type  of  
commodity that is transported, one representative distance, and the occurrence of the same water 
level everywhere along the river. If necessary, these assumptions could be made more realistic 
for policy studies.
Appendix A – Change in expected welfare
This  appendix gives the intermediate steps for deriving the expanded version of the expression 
for the change in expected welfare, ∆ [ ], in equation (6):
∆ [ ]=  [ ]−   [   ]
=
      
    (  [  ]−     [   ])
=
      



















































































































Appendix B – Intermediate steps for optimal barge size example
This appendix contains the first-order and second-order conditions for deriving the optimal barge 
size    .
The first-order condition reads:
  
           
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 + 2  )−       +(1 −   ) 2       
−     + (1 −  )    
        <     (  − 1)        −     
       
      + (1 −  ) −     
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+     + (1 −  ) (  
 + 2  ) > 0 .
This is a quadratic expression in terms of      .
Appendix C – Table showing Dutch inland navigation fleet split up by tonnage
Table A.C.1: Number of Active Barges under Dutch Flag for different Tonnage Classes
Period
650 – 1000 
tonne
1000 – 1500 
tonne
1500 – 2000 
tonne
2000 – 3000 
tonne
> 3000 tonne
1997 1798 1124 429 596 145
1998 1191 1075 407 580 142
1999 1192 1104 411 608 151
2000 1288 1065 406 625 147
2001 1067 1078 442 696 171
2002 1045 1051 456 729 178
Source: CBS(2010)
Note: More recent data were not available from CBS.
Appendix D–More detailed regression output for the effective capacity 
estimationThis  appendix gives more  detail  for  the  effective  capacity  estimation in  equation (7).  The 
logarithm of the loadfactor is regressed on the waterlevel, the logarithm of the shipsize, their 
interaction, and a few other variables that are reported below. For the waterlevel variable, the 
logarithm of the shipsize and their interaction, the coefficient estimates, t-values and the 95 per 
cent confidence intervals are given. The complete regression output can be obtained from the 
author upon request.
Table A.D.1: More detailed output for loadfactor/effective-capacity estimation
Logloadfact Coef. T 95% Conf. Interval
Wlev -0.0135 -10.58 -0.0160 -0.0110
Logshipsize -0.5850 -23.28 -0.6343 -0.5358
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